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ABSTRACT 
After September 11, 2001, a large-scale overhaul of existing US 
immigration infrastructure fused immigration with the country’s 
national security apparatus. Enhanced national security efforts became 
characterized by increased immigration enforcement and were 
purportedly justified by government officials’ rhetoric portraying 
newcomers as a threat to public safety. The Trump Administration 
employed inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric to shore up popular 
support for harmful immigration policies, precluding the United States 
from fulfilling obligations to refugees and asylum-seekers under 
international law. This Note argues that the United States shares 
virtually none of the geopolitical challenges preventing certain countries 
from compliance with treaty obligations; however, rhetoric conflating 
immigration and national security results in immigration policy 
damaging to refugees and asylees seeking protection in the United States. 
This Note argues that the United States must work towards compliance 
with its international commitments by dismantling needlessly punitive 
immigration enforcement policies and abolishing xenophobic rhetoric, 
and by providing fair and full protection for the growing number of 
individuals displaced around the globe. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tragic attacks of 9/11, 2001 left a lasting impact on the 
American people, compelling both government officials and the 
public to question the shortcomings of the United States’ 
national security infrastructure. Most are familiar with what 
followed almost immediately thereafter, beginning with former 
President George W. Bush’s announcement of the War on Terror 
military campaign.1 What many do not acknowledge, however, is 
the devastating blow dealt by 9/11 and its aftermath to the US 
immigration system.2 
Pursuant to the Bush Administration’s belief in strict 
immigration enforcement as a counterterrorism tactic, Congress 
enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, creating the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) which 
enveloped twenty-two federal agencies, including those 
performing immigration-related functions, under its purview.3 
With the creation of DHS came the dissolution of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the agency 
formerly tasked with matters pertaining to immigration and 
 
1. Deepa Iyer & Jayesh Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation of United States 








2. See generally MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., US IMMIGRATION 
POLICY SINCE 9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM (2011). 
3. See id. at 4. 
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naturalization.4 The overhaul of the former immigration 
infrastructure, along with other acts that followed, resulted in the 
virtual fusion of immigration into the national security apparatus, 
with enforcement becoming the primary concern. 
Problems associated with conflating immigration and 
national security are now more apparent than ever. The world 
currently faces the largest refugee crisis since World War II, and 
the United States struggles with the humanitarian crisis at its 
southern border, with record numbers of asylum-seekers 
continuing to arrive daily.5 Justifying its actions with rhetoric 
emphasizing the protection of national security interests, the 
Trump Administration responded to these crises by enacting a 
multitude of measures to restrict the influx of refugees and 
asylum-seekers, and to dismantle years of protective policy. In 
doing so, it violated US obligations under international 
agreements including the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“1951 Convention”) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”).6 
While the United States neglects its commitments under 
international law, other nations attempt to accommodate the 
growing influx of refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing from 
persecution in their countries of origin. Where the Trump 
Administration weakened refugee and asylee protections in the 
United States, Canada surpassed the United States in refugee 
resettlement efforts.7 Further, member states of the European 
Union pledged to create tens of thousands of refugee 
 
4. See Iyer & Rathod, supra note 1. 
5. Molly O’Toole & Defense One, Are Refugees Really a ‘National Security’ Threat to 
America?, A (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/us-policy-syrian-
refugees/409822/ [https://perma.cc/23YU-HUX9]; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says 
Trump Administration Can Begin Denying Asylum to Migrants While Legal Fight Continues, 





6. See discussion infra notes 204-221. 
7. Jynnah Radford & Phillip Connor, Canada Now Leads the World in Refugee 
Resettlement, Surpassing the US, P Rs. C. (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/19/canada-now-leads-the-world-in-
refugee-resettlement-surpassing-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/V9TB-UZA3]. 
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resettlement spots to mitigate the burden on Greece and Italy, 
whose immigration systems have been overwhelmed by refugees.8  
This Note analyzes the United States’ neglect of its 
guarantees to refugees and asylum-seekers under the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, explaining how anti-immigrant 
rhetoric has served as purported justification for the recent 
promulgation of increasingly harmful policies. Part II of this Note 
provides background on the evolution of United States 
immigration policies and rhetoric after 9/11, introducing United 
States obligations to refugees and asylum-seekers under 
international law and the impact of these changes on the United 
States government’s ability to fulfill its obligations. Part III 
compares refugee and asylum policies of fellow state signatories 
to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol to those of the 
United States, discussing the troublesome effects of a narrative 
that conflates national security and immigration enforcement on 
countries’ commitments to refugees and asylum-seekers under 
international law. Part IV of this Note discusses proposals for 
reforming US refugee and asylum policy, emphasizing the need 
to distinguish between immigration and national security 
concerns, while ensuring that national security interests do not 
fall by the wayside. The Note’s conclusion affirms the 2021 US 
administration change as an opportune time to implement 
lasting immigration reforms that will result in increased US 
capability to fulfill its obligations under international law and 
subsequently reaffirm its commitment to protecting refugees and 
asylum-seekers. 
 
8. See DETELIN IVANOV, LEGISLATION ON EMERGENCY RELOCATION OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN THE EU, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2015). See also Legislative 
Train Schedule Toward a New Policy on Migration, EUR. PARLIAMENT, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-
migration/file-2nd-emergency-relocation-scheme [https://perma.cc/7DZ7-XX5J] (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2021). In response to the refugee crisis, in September of 2015, the 
European Council agreed to relocate 40,000 asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece to 
other member states. Just three weeks after the first proposal, the Council adopted a 
(later amended) second proposal to relocate an additional 120,000 migrants. By March 
of 2018, approximately 34,000 asylum-seekers had been relocated—falling short of the 
relocation goals of the 2015 proposals. See id. 
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II. OVERVIEW: EVOLVING IMMIGRATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
& LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO REFUGEES AND ASYLEES 
A. US Obligations Under International and Domestic Law 
In response to the displacement of millions after World War 
II, government leaders drafted the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, defining the term “refugee” and delineating 
a number of legal protections for those considered refugees.9 The 
most essential provision, the non-refoulement principle, codified as 
Article 33, states, “No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”10 This binding rule 
of international law prohibits a country from returning a refugee 
to any country, not necessarily her country of origin, where her 
life or freedom is threatened.11 The principle of non-refoulement is 
applicable to both refugees and asylees, and has since been 
codified in numerous human rights instruments. Drafters of 
international treaties have included the non-refoulement principle 
in a number of agreements, and consider it a fundamental feature 
of customary international law.12 
The 1951 Convention sought to protect European refugees 
after World War II. The 1967 Protocol extended the 1951 
Convention’s application, and prolonged the validity of the 
Convention’s provisions by removing time limitations on its 
applicability.13 The United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 
1968 through a 98-0 vote in the Senate, with United Nations 
 
9. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
10. See id. art. 33. 
11. Id. 
12. See Tilman Rodenhauser, The principle of non-refoulement in the migration context: 
5 key points, RELIEFWEB (Mar. 30, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/principle-
non-refoulement-migration-context-5-key-points [https://perma.cc/ADM8-X7TM]. 
The principle of non-refoulement has been included in numerous human rights treaties 
and regional human rights instruments, including the Convention Against Torture and 
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. See id. 
13. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
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representative James R. Wiggins emphasizing that “the proper, 
legal treatment of asylum seekers and refugees was a credit to our 
country, not a burden.”14 
The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the United States’ 
commitments to its obligations under the 1967 Protocol into 
domestic law.15 Prior to 1980, the United States lacked the 
infrastructure for addressing the thousands of Vietnamese and 
Cambodian refugees fleeing from the disastrous aftermath of the 
Vietnam War.16 Congress was eager to establish an efficient 
refugee admission framework that would not rely as heavily on 
the executive parole power, and unanimously passed the Refugee 
Act of 1980.17 The Act, inter alia, brought the definition of refugee 
into conformity with that of the 1951 Convention, raised the 
annual refugee ceiling to 50,000, and created the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement.18 Debated by Congress for three years, the 
Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrated a commitment on the part of 
Congress to enact a “nondiscriminatory, universal refugee and 
asylum policy”19 that was to focus on the plight of the individual 
refugee in determining who would be admitted to the United 
States.20 
 
14. See Robert Barsky, The Legal Responsibilities of the United States Towards Asylum 
Seekers, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://cmsny.org/publications/barsky-us-legal-responsibilities-asylum-seekers/ 
[https://perma.cc/K696-NVDF]. 
15. See id. 
16. See United States Postwar Immigration Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-postwar-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/D873-
RHTB], (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
17. Refugee Act of 1980, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUND., 
https://www.archivesfoundation.org/documents/refugee-act-1980/ 
[https://perma.cc/N2KR-P5TH] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). The United States lacked a 
comprehensive framework for addressing the influx of refugees from Southeast Asia, so 
the Ford Administration enacted the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act 
to help over a hundred thousand refugees. Executive parole power granted this influx, 
after which Congressional concern about such expansive use of the parole statute 
prompted the restructuring of the United States refugee admission system in the Refugee 
Act of 1980. See David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: A Forlorn Anniversary, LAWFARE 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/refugee-act-1980-forlorn-anniversary 
[https://perma.cc/Z58Y-V4WD]. 
18. See id. 
19. Deborah Anker, The Refugee Act of 1980 An Historical Perspective, 5 IN DEFENSE 
OF THE ALIEN 89, 92 (1982). 
20. See id. at 93. 
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For years following the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 
the United States was perceived as a country priding itself on 
providing a safe haven for refugees and asylum-seekers.21 
However, despite having led the world in refugee admissions for 
decades and having admitted more refugees each year than any 
other country, America’s refugee protections have been 
disintegrating, more so following the events of 9/11.22 The 
overhaul of America’s immigration framework post 9/11 and 
subsequent transition to a focus on enforcement affected many 
of the immigrant and nonimmigrant classes, with particularly 
detrimental effects on humanitarian migrants.23 
B. Post 9/11 Changes to the United States’ Immigration Framework 
Prior to the events of 9/11, the trajectory of US immigration 
policy had anticipated comprehensive immigration reform. 
During the Clinton Administration, Congress passed “four laws . 
. . granting certain groups relief from some of the most restrictive 
provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) and permitting some undocumented 
immigrants to legalize their status.”24 In the beginning of his 
presidency, George W. Bush seemed to favor a thorough 
restructuring of the US immigration framework. As a Spanish-
speaking former governor of a border state, constituents 
expected Bush to follow through on his campaign promises of 
expediting immigration processing for families and employers.25 
Valuing the votes of the growing Hispanic population, he 
developed a close working relationship with Mexico’s then-
president, Vicente Fox, and anticipated improvements in the 
form of a new temporary worker program.26 However, any efforts 
to facilitate migration negotiations with Mexico instantly broke 
off after the tragedy of 9/11, and US leaders were left to 
 
21. Blueprint: How to Address the Global Refugee Crisis and Safeguard United States 
National Security, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/how-address-global-refugee-crisis-and-
safeguard-us-national-security [https://perma.cc/BL8J-BMS8]. 
22. See O’Toole, supra note 5. 
23. See infra notes 31-55. 
24. ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 2. 
25. See id. at 2-3. During Bush’s campaign, he had argued that “immigration is not 
a problem to be solved; it is the sign of a successful nation.” Id. at 3. 
26. See id. at 3. 
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reconsider a national security framework that had failed to 
prevent one of the most catastrophic incidents in US history to 
date. The Bush Administration in 2007 and the Obama 
Administration in 2010 each attempted to revisit comprehensive 
immigration reforms, but pushback from anti-immigration 
politicians rendered attempts at reform fruitless.27 
Almost instantly after 9/11, the government’s outlook on 
immigration drastically shifted. A trend of conflating immigration 
and national security emerged as the government deployed 
immigration resources pursuant to national security objectives.28 
Federal officials learned that the individuals responsible for 
carrying out the attacks had entered the country on student and 
visitor visas, thereby leading to a heightened scrutiny of 
immigration processes as the core of post-9/11 national security 
concerns.29 In the weeks following the attacks, Congress and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) significantly broadened the scope 
of federal agencies including the former INS. They promulgated 
a regulation allowing for the detention of noncitizens for forty-
eight hours or longer “in the event of ‘an emergency or other 
extraordinary circumstances’ without making any charging 
determinations.”30 As a result of this policy, the INS detained over 
750 noncitizens in about one year, and placed them on the “INS 
Custody List” under suspicion that they had ties to the attacks or 
other terrorist activities.31 Over the course of the next several 
years, Congress and the Bush Administration passed a host of 
broad antiterrorism measures, all of which would affect 
immigration policy.32 The policies both expanded immigration 
enforcement powers within the United States, and restructured 
the existing immigration framework with an eye towards 
escalating national security efforts. 
 
27. See Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-
immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/ [https://perma.cc/5S6E-EMCU]. 
28. See Iyer & Rathod, supra note 1. 
29. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 4. During the course of the 9/11 plot, the 
hijackers submitted 23 visa applications – 22 of which were approved. Secure Visas Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, 
First Session, on H.R. 1741, May 11, 2001 43 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). 
30. Iyer & Rathod, supra note 1. 
31. See id. 
32. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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Measures enacted in the first few years following 9/11 
included the USA Patriot Act, which, among other provisions, 
mandated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
provide criminal records to immigration agencies during visa 
screening.33 A 2002 DOJ program implemented the Enhanced 
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, necessitating 
“additional data sharing, tightening document security, and 
accelerated implementation of foreign student and entry-
tracking systems.” The National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System required male immigrants from twenty-five named 
countries to undergo complex screening measures, including the 
submission of biometric data, interviews with immigration 
officers, and annual registration requirements.34 The US-VISIT 
program, implemented in 2004, ultimately merged these 
enhanced immigrant-tracking programs, making immigrants’ 
movements easier to document by requiring nonimmigrants on 
temporary visas to regularly submit biometric data, including 
when receiving a visa, at ports of entry, and when leaving the 
United States.35 The US government instituted these policies, 
among others, pursuant to the push for restriction and 
heightened scrutiny of individuals seeking admission to the 
United States. 
One of the most noteworthy changes of the post-9/11 era was 
Congress’ enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
which brought twenty-two federal agencies under the scope of a 
new cabinet agency, the Department of Homeland Security.36 In 
forming the new DHS, Congress made clear the department’s 
goal of preventing terrorism and minimizing the impact of terror 
attacks within the United States, and created a position within the 
cabinet for the DHS secretary.37 DHS component agencies 
include the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (“FEMA”), the United States Secret Service, 
the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, and the 
Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”). The INS, formerly the 
premier agency tasked with performing immigration-related 
 
33. See id. at 5. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. at 4. 
37. See Iyer & Rathod, supra note 1. 
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functions, was also dissolved and separated into three agencies 
within DHS: the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”), Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).38 
Today, USCIS is the agency primarily responsible for 
adjudicating immigration and naturalization petitions, 
considering refugee and asylum claims, issuing employment 
authorization, and processing a vast array of nonimmigrant visa 
applications.39 It processes some six million immigrant and 
nonimmigrant petitions annually, and funds its budget almost 
exclusively through steep processing fees charged to petitioners 
submitting applications.40 USCIS takes on the critical role of 
assessing the qualification of applicants for admission to the 
United States.41 Its specific functions include confirming 
applicant eligibility for various immigration benefits and granting 
or withholding such benefits where appropriate. Additionally, it 
adjudicates refugee and asylum applications, and determines the 
eligibility of permanent residents applying for citizenship by 
assessing factors such as whether the individual possesses good 
moral character and has resided in the United States for the 
statutorily required period of time.42 
Frustration with USCIS today stems primarily from the 
agency’s trend of falling acutely behind on adjudication of visa 
applications and petitions, the timely processing of which may 
bear significantly on an individual’s immigration status.43 Last 
year, after analysis revealed “crisis-level delays” in the agency’s 
processing of documents, the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association recommended that the agency rescind burdensome 
policies that significantly delay processing, to increase 
congressional oversight and to increase transparency to the 
 
38. See id. 
39.  See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44038, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS) FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING 1-2 (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44038.pdf [https://perma.cc/J344-58VY]. 
40. See id. at 1, 3, 5. 
41. See id. at 3-4. 
42. See id. at 2-4. 
43. See Paul Stern & Sharvari (Shev) Dalal-Dheini, AILA Policy Brief: Crisis Level 
USCIS Processing Delays and Inefficiencies Continue to Grow, AM. IMMIG. LAW. ASS’N (Feb. 26, 
2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-policy-briefs/crisis-level-uscis-processing-
delays-grow [https://perma.cc/3THP-98SL]. 
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public as to its operations.44 Data from 2019 confirms that these 
inefficiencies remain and continue to worsen, as overall 
processing times rose another five percent, despite a ten percent 
decrease in cases.45 Processing delays can be attributed to 
increasingly troublesome policies, including requiring local 
USCIS officers to perform comprehensive interviews of 
employment-based adjustment applicants and refugee/asylee 
relatives before adjudicating their applications, and a recently 
instituted policy of rejecting applications from “asylum seekers 
and victims of criminal activity if any fields are left blank on the 
form.”46 Practically, local USCIS officers are left to closely 
scrutinize a multitude of forms varying in importance, with 
seemingly inconsequential clerical errors resulting in avoidable 
delays of the application process for applicants facing strict filing 
deadlines.47 
CBP, another of the three agencies tasked with performing 
immigration-related functions, is charged with border security, 
counterterrorism efforts, agricultural protection, and facilitating 
trade.48 The agency’s mission statement is “to serve as the premier 
law enforcement agency enhancing the Nation’s safety, security, 
and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and 
integration.”49 Over the last several years, shocking accounts 
accusing CBP agents of abuse and mistreatment of immigrants 
seeking entry at the border have surfaced, resulting in calls for 
greater transparency and accountability on the part of the 
agency.50 While instances of such misconduct recently came to 
demand more national attention, they are in no way a new 
development.51 For many years, organizations have cited the 
terribly inadequate medical assistance afforded migrants, 
 
44. Id. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. 
48. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/Y2XF-B4PN] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020). 
49. Id. 
50. See Suzanne Gamboa & Daniella Silva, From accountability to medical care, critics 
cry for serious reform of border agency, NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/accountability-medical-care-critics-cry-serious-
reform-border-agency-n950046 [https://perma.cc/X87R-XJZX]. 
51. See id. 
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including young children, arriving at the border.52 A recent 
report by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) revealed 
30,000 pages of federal records “documenting complaints of 
abuse and mistreatment, including rape and assault of 
unaccompanied children by agents.”53 Further, the conditions at 
migrant detention facilities have been abhorrent since the 
Obama Administration, when an ACLU lawsuit referred to these 
facilities as “hieleras” or “iceboxes,” and accused CBP of 
maintaining “appalling conditions” that left people in “freezing, 
overcrowded, and filthy cells for extended periods of time,” 
without access to soap and showers, let alone legal assistance.54 
Rather than increasing its capability to ensure the safety of 
vulnerable women and children in its custody, over the years CBP 
has become an organization devoted to arresting adult males 
attempting to cross the border.55 
Perhaps the most controversial agency established to take 
over the functions of the former INS is ICE, the government’s arm 
for domestic immigration enforcement.56 ICE was established to 
“protect Americans from the cross-border crime and illegal 
immigration that threaten national security and public safety,”57 
 
52. See id. 
53. Id. 
54. Jason Lemon, Are Migrant Detention Centers Worse Under Donald Trump Than 
Under Barack Obama?, NEWSWEEK (July 2, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/migrant-
detention-centers-trump-obama-1447160 [https://perma.cc/6B36-3CX9]; see also, 
Madeleine Joung, What is Happening at Migrant Detention Centers? Here’s What to Know, 
TIME (July 12, 2019), https://time.com/5623148/migrant-detention-centers-
conditions/ [https://perma.cc/H9BE-X6K6]. 
55. See Gamboa, supra note 50. 
56. Ron Nixon & Linda Qiu, What is ICE and Why Do Critics Want to Abolish It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/politics/fact-check-ice-
immigration-abolish.html [https://perma.cc/4ARD-B8W3]. Over the last several years, 
the “Abolish ICE” movement has gained tremendous momentum, and protestors have 
spoken out against the agency’s aggressive enforcement tactics, with politicians including 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand “arguing that immigration issues should be separate from 
criminal enforcement” and calling for immigration reform. Id. See also ICE and Border 
Patrol Abuses, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-
patrol-abuses [https://perma.cc/YE5A-WVYT] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Marcela 
Garcia, ICE should be fixed, not abolished, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 6, 2020), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/10/06/opinion/should-ice-be-abolished/ 
[https://perma.cc/4SQD-D3HE]. 
57. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/immigration-and-customs-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/RA2K-JL4L] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). 
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by working alongside law enforcement to identify priority aliens 
already incarcerated, to apprehend individuals deemed a public 
threat based on their immigration status, and to locate foreign 
nationals within the United States wanted for international 
crimes.58 ICE’s declared mission is to combat cross-border 
criminal activity and prevent terrorism, but the agency’s website 
is a paradigmatic example of the rhetoric used to conflate 
immigration and national security, offering national security as a 
justification for deporting undocumented immigrants. 
Deportations first began to increase dramatically during 
President Barack Obama’s tenure, peaking at 409,849 
deportations in fiscal year (“FY”) 2012, but dropping again to 
235,413 deportations by FY 2015.59 Under the Trump 
Administration, immigration enforcement tactics became more 
aggressive as ICE officials began conducting raids at locations 
such as churches, schools, and factories, inflicting fear and panic 
upon immigrant communities.60 Increasingly aggressive 
immigration policies shifted the agency’s priorities from targeting 
undocumented immigrants charged with serious crimes, to 
targeting all undocumented immigrants without regard for 
criminal history.61 In the summer of 2019, President Trump 
announced “Operation Border Resolve,” and threatened 
widespread ICE raids, causing immigrant families to relocate to 
 
58. Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. I  Css E, 
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).  
59. Immigration Policies Under Barack Obama, BOUNDLESS (May 21, 2017), 
https://www.boundless.com/blog/obama/ [https://perma.cc/425S-KR8C]. 
60. Miriam Jordan, ICE Arrests Hundreds in Mississippi Raids Targeting Immigrant 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/ice-raids-
mississippi.html [https://perma.cc/A7S8-FD3W]; Caitlin Dickerson & Zolan Kanno-
Youngs, Thousands Are Targeted as ICE Prepares to Raid Undocumented Migrant Families, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/us/politics/ice-families-
deport.html [https://perma.cc/ZD44-CN7E]. 
61. Associated Press, ICE Targeting Immigrants With No Criminal Records at Soaring 
Rate, DAILY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ny-
news-ice-targeting-immigrants-no-criminal-records-20180920-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/NQT6-P4FC] (discussing how arrests of non-criminals have become 
a benchmark of the Trump administration’s approach to immigration); see also Alan 
Gomez, ICE Sets Record for Arrests of Undocumented Immigrants With no Criminal Record, USA 
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evade arrest and leaving immigration advocates scrambling to 
mobilize in time to counsel families about their rights.62 With 
immigrant communities on high alert, ICE agents increasingly 
turned to collateral arrests—where agents arrest others present 
alongside targeted individuals—and deceptive tactics including 
false pretenses to round up undocumented immigrants for 
deportation.63 
Ultimately, agencies performing immigration-related 
functions bend largely to the will of the executive branch, and 
emphasis on immigration enforcement has fluctuated with each 
administration change. Regardless, it cannot be deemphasized 
that the federal agencies carrying out immigration policies have 
long had counter-terrorism efforts as their predominant priority. 
In effectuating a large-scale overhaul of executive-branch 
functions and passing counterterrorism measures aimed at 
heightened scrutiny of foreign nationals within the United States, 
Congress and the Bush Administration compelled a fundamental 
shift in “the core American philosophy toward immigration, 
moving it away from one that is primarily welcoming to one that 
is largely deflective.”64 
C. U.S Refugee and Asylum Policy & the Departure from a Legacy of 
Acceptance 
Provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the REAL ID 
Act of 2005 enacted in the name of national security increased 
the hurdles that refugees and asylum-seekers would have to 
 
62. Miriam Jordan, More Than 2,000 Migrants Were Targeted in Raids. 35 Were 
Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/us/ice-
raids-apprehensions.html [https://perma.cc/5SMW-5XSY]; see also 35 People in Custody 
After U.S. Immigration Raids that Targeted 2,100, CBC (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/united-states-operation-border-resolve-1.5222358 
[https://perma.cc/4372-HHMQ]. 
63. Nausicaa Renner, As Immigrants Become More Aware of Their Rights, ICE Steps Up 
Ruses and Surveillance, INTERCEPT (July 25, 2019), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/25/ice-surveillance-ruse-arrests-raids/ 
[https://perma.cc/N653-K797]; see also ICE Ruses, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, 
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/ice-ruses/ [https://perma.cc/4V9R-5GV5] 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021). 
64. Jake Flanagan, 9/11 Forever Changed The Concept of Immigration in the US, QUARTZ 
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://qz.com/499481/911-forever-changed-the-concept-of-
immigration-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/TA74-Y7LL]; ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 4-
5. 
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overcome in proving their eligibility for resettlement in the 
United States.65 In the years following the passage of these acts, 
President Barack Obama’s legacy was marked by delayed efforts 
to resettle Syrian refugees and his inadequate reaction to the 
ongoing migration crisis on the US southern border. The Obama 
Administration was responsible for initiating practices of harsh 
detention policies and detaining families seeking asylum in 
immigrant detention in violation of US refugee protection 
commitments under international law.66 With the refugee crisis 
worsening, echoes of familiar post-9/11 rhetoric of the need to 
protect national security through strict immigration enforcement 
purported to justify President Trump’s hostile response.67 
The “Refugee” and “Asylee” immigration categories are 
largely similar in definition given that both are intended to 
protect individuals under US law. Differences between the two are 
procedural; an individual requesting protection from overseas is 
referred to as a “refugee,” while an “asylee” is an individual 
meeting the definition of refugee while already present in the 
United States or arriving at a port of entry.68 Eligibility for either 
status hinges upon meeting the definition of refugee found in 
Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
which states that “a refugee is a person who is unable or unwilling 
to return to his or her country of nationality, or of last habitual 
residence if stateless, and who is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country, because of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”69 
To qualify for refugee status, the applicant must be of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States, must meet the 
aforementioned refugee definition, must be admissible, and must 
 
65. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
66. See President Obama’s Legacy on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. FIRST, 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFBackgrounderObamaLegac
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JGN-9QWB] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). 
67. See discussion infra notes 88-94. 
68. Nadwa Mossaad, Refugees and Asylees: 2018, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. OFF. 
IMMIGR. STAT. 1 (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2018/refugees_asylees_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTS8-DYR]. 
69. Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1968). 
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not be firmly resettled in any other country.70 An individual 
seeking refugee status will fall into one of three priority 
categories: first priority (P-1), consisting of those referred by the 
UN High Commissioner on Refugees, a United States Embassy, 
or certain NGOs; second priority (P-2), consisting of groups of 
special humanitarian concern; and third priority (P-3), consisting 
of family reunification cases.71 One year after admission to the 
United States, refugees must apply for legal permanent resident 
(“LPR”) status, and can then apply for US citizenship five years 
after admission.72 
Asylum claims are adjudicated differently from those of 
refugees, as individuals typically seek asylum from the interior of 
the United States or at ports of entry, including those along the 
southern border. Applications for asylum can be filed in one of 
two ways: affirmative asylum and defensive asylum.73 Affirmative 
asylum occurs when an individual presents his/her case in a non-
adversarial proceeding, typically in front of a USCIS officer.74 
Defensive asylum occurs where the government has commenced 
removal proceedings against an individual who must then contest 
his/her removability.75 
Individuals are precluded from obtaining asylum “for 
previously committing certain crimes, posing a national security 
threat, engaging in the persecution of others, or firmly resettling 
in another country before coming to the United States.”76 A 
USCIS officer may make the determination as to an applicant’s 
eligibility for asylum during the affirmative asylum process.77 
Likewise, an immigration judge (“IJ”) may grant or deny asylum 
 
70. Mossaad, supra note 68, at 2. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 4. 
73. Affirmative Asylum, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/affirmative-
asylum.html [https://perma.cc/P4K5-7CZC] (last visited Jan. 11, 2021); see also Asylum 
in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/95DE-4DN8]. 
74. See Asylum in the United States, supra note 73, at 2. 
75. See id. 
76. Id.; Asylum Bars, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-
asylum/asylum/asylum-bars [https://perma.cc/7JTD-YZHN] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021). 
77. See id. 
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during an individual’s removal proceedings.78 Unlike those 
seeking admission to the United States as refugees, asylum 
applicants are not subject to an annual admissions cap, and for 
each of the last several years, over 100,000 individuals have 
applied for asylum annually.79 
Each year, the President sets a ceiling for refugee admissions, 
indicating the maximum number of refugees who may settle in 
the United States for that fiscal year.80 For years following the 
1980 Refugee Act passed during the Carter Administration, the 
average admissions ceiling for refugees was 95,000 annually.81 
Such high admissions levels endured throughout the Reagan 
Administration, as Cuban refugees arrived in thousands, along 
with those escaping the Khmer Rouge genocides in Cambodia, 
and Indochinese refugees arriving after the fall of Saigon.82 After 
9/11, refugee admissions dipped, “due in part to security 
procedures and admission requirement changes after [9/11],” 
but increased again between 2001 and 2009, ultimately hitting a 
seventeen-year high of 84,988 refugees admitted in 2016 under 
the Obama Administration.83 
During his first year in office, President Trump quickly 
moved to suspend refugee admissions for four months, and 
issued three iterations of his “Muslim Ban,” upheld in its third 
version by the Supreme Court.84 This proclamation prohibited 
travel to the United States by foreign nationals from six 
predominantly Muslim countries and North Korea, as well as 
certain Venezuelan government officials.85 President Trump then 
reduced the refugee admissions ceiling by almost seventy-five 




80. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key facts about refugees to the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-
to-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/3HL9-3WVY]. 




83. Mossaad, supra note 68, at 3. 
84. Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F. 3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Timeline of the Muslim 
Ban, ACLU WASH., https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban 
[https://perma.cc/JJ7W-9SSV] (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
85. Timeline of the Muslim Ban, supra note 84. 
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the previous cap of 110,000 in FY 2017.86 In FY 2020 the Trump 
Administration reduced the refugee admissions ceiling to a mere 
18,000 refugees, the lowest number since the passage of the 
Refugee Act of 1980.87 
More notable than President Trump’s decision to reduce the 
refugee admissions ceiling was his administration’s response to 
migrants arriving at the southern border—an issue that the 
President routinely referred to as an “invasion” and a “national 
emergency.”88 The problems inherent in conflating immigration 
and national security are glaringly evident here, as the President 
continuously invoked national security rhetoric to portray a 
pressing humanitarian crisis as an imminent threat to US national 
security. During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump became 
notorious for his platform, largely premised on calls for increased 
border security to be accomplished by building a wall along the 
southern border.89 
As justification, Trump framed Latino immigrants as a 
threat, claiming that they import crime and drugs, are rapists, and 
are primarily arriving from Latin America, South America, and 
the Middle East.90 Even as reports surfaced evidencing the lack of 
correlation between immigrants and crime, Trump continued to 
portray immigrants as the source of national security issues, 
claiming that a wall would “restore integrity and the rule of law to 
our borders.”91 In 2018, Trump’s impassioned calls for a border 
wall resumed, this time in response to several migrant caravans, 
consisting mostly of Central Americans, headed towards the 
 
86. Nicole Narea, The US will admit just 18,000 refugees in the next year, VOX (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/26/20886038/trump-
refugee-cap-executive-order [https://perma.cc/U6C8-WC3T]. See also Reuters Staff, 
Trump Administration sets record low limit for new US refugees, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-refugees/trump-administration-
sets-record-low-limit-for-new-u-s-refugees-idUSKBN27D1TS [https://perma.cc/5ZU9-
4HDJ] (indicating that the Trump Administration capped the number of refugees 
allowed to resettle in the US in FY 2021 at a record low of 15,000). 
87. Krogstad, supra note 80. 
88. Micah Luxen et al., Is There a Crisis on the US-Mexico Border?, BBC NEWS (July 11, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44319094 
[https://perma.cc/4FB3-UDJC]. 
89. Rebecca Morin, A Quick History of Trump’s Evolving Justifications for a Border Wall, 
POLITICO (Jan. 08, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/08/trumps-
evolving-reasons-border-wall-1088046 [https://perma.cc/3B25-TWZZ]. 
90. See id. 
91. Id. 
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southern border.92 The following year, news reports revealed that 
White House officials had dramatically falsified the number of 
known or suspected terrorists apprehended by CBP agents at the 
border.93 While officials claimed that CBP had apprehended 
around 4,000 known or suspected terrorists crossing the border, 
news reports showed that just six foreign nationals apprehended 
at the southern border returned matches in the Terrorist 
Screening Database from October 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018.94 
President Trump and officials in his administration 
empowered USCIS, CBP, and ICE to carry out an agenda based 
primarily on enforcement, and manipulated immigration policy 
to slow down and complicate the adjudication of asylum claims.95 
Upon taking office, he quickly signed two executive orders—one 
focused on immigration enforcement in the interior, and one 
focused on border security.96 Border security efforts were largely 
fixated on the southwest border with Mexico, evidenced by the 
President’s plans to construct a border wall, as well as his desire 
to restrict the rising influx of asylum-seeking individuals and 
families arriving at the border.97 
Where enhanced border security efforts in previous years 
have largely targeted single men from Mexico seeking work in the 
United States, today’s migrants are predominantly coming to the 
United States for humanitarian reasons, as asylum-seekers fleeing 
violence in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.98 In 2018 
alone, over 90,000 people made claims of credible fear, the first 
step in initiating the asylum process, at the border.99 However, 
instead of shifting focus to the protection of these individuals, the 
Trump Administration’s approach remained akin to earlier 
approaches towards border security—centering largely on 
 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. See discussion infra notes 105-113. 
96. SARAH PIERCE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN THE FIRST TWO 
YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1 (May 2019), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ImmigrationChang
esTrumpAdministration-FinalWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3WY-4CMT] 
97. Id. at 2. 
98. Jo Craven McGinty, The Changing Face of Illegal Border Crossings, WALL STREET J. 
(July 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-changing-face-of-illegal-border-
crossings-1531474201 [https://perma.cc/36J5-XNPB]. 
99. Luxen, supra note 88. 
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enforcement through apprehension.100 In 2018, the Trump 
Administration’s border security efforts developed into a zero-
tolerance policy, resulting in the indiscriminate prosecution of all 
adults apprehended while crossing the US-Mexico border.101 
Adherence to this policy triggered family separation on a large 
scale, and DHS began separating thousands of children from 
parents referred for prosecution until mass public condemnation 
of the practice led to its decline.102 The Trump Administration 
took additional measures to increase border security—it 
deployed national guard troops to the border, increased United 
States Border Patrol staff levels, and heightened investigation into 
family units to ensure that families arriving at the border were 
biologically related.103 In 2019, after Congress appropriated 
significantly fewer funds than the President’s requested amount 
for the continued construction of the border wall, Trump 
ordered upwards of six billion dollars in additional funding 
diverted from counterdrug activities, a Treasury Department 
fund for forfeitures, and military construction projects towards 
his plans to build a wall.104 
Recently, President Trump enacted two additional policies 
to deter asylum-seekers from the southern border. The first 
policy, officially referred to as the Migrant Protection Protocols,105 
stipulates that migrants at the southern border must stay in 
Mexico while the immigration agencies process their claims for 
asylum.106 The second policy, involving a recent agreement with 
Guatemala akin to a Safe Third Country Agreement,107 
 
100. PIERCE, supra note 96; see also John Gramlich, How Border Apprehensions, ICE 
Arrests and Deportations Have Changed Under Trump, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 2, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-
arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/NNY5-MST9]. 
101. The Trump Administration’s “Zero Tolerance” Immigration Enforcement Policy, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV. (updated Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45266.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAJ6-L6ES]. 
102. Id. at 9. 
103. See PIERCE, supra note 96, at 2-3. 
104. Id. at 4. 
105. The policy is commonly referred to as “Remain in Mexico.” 
106. Frequently Asked Questions: “Remain in Mexico” Policy, JUST. FOR IMMIGRANTS, 
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Remain-in-
Mexico_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/93XR-PVKN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
107. Asylum-seekers and refugees cannot be returned to their country of origin but 
may, at the discretion of the Attorney General, be removed to a safe third country where 
they “would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum 
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disincentivizes immigration to the United States by requiring 
migrants to have made asylum claims at countries traversed en 
route to the US southern border, risking sending asylum-seekers 
to countries equally or more dangerous than those from which 
they fled.108 
Regarding interior enforcement, President Trump departed 
from the precedent of past administrations, opting to target all 
undocumented noncitizens rather than focusing on recent 
border crossers and those with criminal records or standing 
removal orders.109 ICE, tasked with the detention and removal of 
undocumented immigrants, played an integral role in carrying 
out the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement 
operations.110 The agency’s scope expanded with the creation of 
the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement Office 
(“VOICE”), a vehicle for individuals to bring claims of 
victimization by criminal immigrants.111 Further, under the 
Trump Administration, ICE was authorized to take enforcement 
actions against all noncitizens with final removal orders, even 
noncitizens abused while in the United States who indicated a 
willingness to aid law enforcement in investigating criminal 
activity in anticipation of receiving a U-Visa.112 Among other 
actions taken to secure the interior, the Trump Administration 
attempted to restrict funding for sanctuary cities, allowed for the 
 
or equivalent temporary protection.” INA § 208(a)(2)(A). See also Nicole Narea, Trump’s 
agreements in Central America are dismantling the asylum system as we know it, VOX (Nov. 20, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-honduras-
guatemala-el-salvador-explained [https://perma.cc/G33T-8U3K]. Safe Third Country 
Agreements “require migrants to seek asylum in the countries they pass through by 
deeming those countries capable of offering them protection.” Id. 
108. Jasmine Aguilera, Trump’s New Restrictions on Asylum Seekers Violate U.S. and 
International Law, Experts Say, TIME (Jul. 24, 2019), https://time.com/5626498/trump-
asylum-rule-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/ZH2G-JDF9]. 
109. Ryan Devereaux, Trump Targets Undocumented Families, Not Felons, in First 100 
Days, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/04/28/100-days-of-
deportations-trump-policies-terrorize-immigrant-families-and-neglect-criminals/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8GF-BXSJ]. 
110. See KANDEL, supra note 39. 
111. Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office, U.S. IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/voice [https://perma.cc/6QME-HLDU] (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
112. PIERCE, supra note 96. U visas are allocated for certain crime victims who are 
helpful to government officials and law enforcement during ongoing investigations and 
criminal prosecutions. Id. at 5. 
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detention of pregnant women, increased worksite enforcement 
and investigation, and narrowed prosecutorial discretion, 
reducing the “instances in which the government should grant 
prosecutorial discretion to noncitizens identified for removal.”113 
Further, under the Trump Administration, the role of the 
Justice Department regarding immigration policymaking vastly 
expanded. DOJ is the executive agency primarily charged with law 
enforcement and the administration of justice. Its role in the 
immigration system consists of criminal prosecutions and 
management of the US immigration court system.114 Attorneys 
General (“AGs”) under President Trump were pivotal in enacting 
policies detrimental to refugees and asylum-seekers and in 
perpetuating the Trump Administration’s anti-immigrant 
agenda. AG Jeff Sessions, known for being an immigration 
hardliner, used the AG’s power of review over immigration 
decisions rendered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
to impede asylum applications based on domestic or gang 
violence.115 Although the application of the ruling was later 
partially enjoined, in Matter of A-B-, AG Sessions overruled the 
BIA’s landmark decision in Matter of A-R-C-G, which held that 
domestic violence survivors may be eligible for asylum 
protection.116 In conjunction with AGs using their power to 
impose limits on asylum for victims of domestic violence and to 
limit the scope of asylum hearings, in recent years, IJs have been 
instructed to weaken child-friendly court practices, to limit 
continuances and terminations in removal proceedings, and to 
discourage change of venue for court cases.117 
Ultimately, under the facade of protecting the American 
people, the Trump Administration framed the plight of families 
fleeing persecution as a pressing national security concern. It 
failed to resolve the crisis at the US southern border and 
perpetuated the issues inherent in America’s immigration 
infrastructure since 9/11. Calls for increased border security, 
 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Id. at 10. 
115. Id. at 14-16. 
116. Matter of A-B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGR. 
L. ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/matter-of-a-b-case-updates-
current-trends [https://perma.cc/Z53L-6WJK]. 
117. PIERCE, supra note 96, at 13. 
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falsified figures, and rhetoric commending CBP officers for their 
work in combatting terrorism have all contributed to framing 
immigrants as a national security threat, while the current 
makeup of the migrant population coming to the border tells an 
entirely different story. 
D. Modern-Day Humanitarian Migrant Demographics 
For many years, violence, corruption, and extreme political 
and economic turmoil have plagued the Northern Triangle, a 
region that includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.118 
The migrant population arriving at the southern border today is 
overwhelmingly comprised of asylum seekers, primarily women 
and children fleeing from danger.119 Those abandoning their 
home countries to seek asylum have reasons markedly different 
from a desire to relocate, reunite with family, or reap economic 
benefits. Rather, they are typically individuals forced to escape 
from persecution, armed conflict, or widespread human rights 
violations.120 
A multitude of factors have driven people away from 
Northern Triangle countries in astonishingly large numbers. In 
both Guatemala and Honduras, over half of the population lives 
below their country’s national poverty line.121 In all of the 
Northern Triangle countries, there is a deeply entrenched 
“criminal ecosystem” which includes gangs such as Mara 
Salvatrucha and the Eighteenth Street Gang, popularly known as 
MS-13, and MS-18, respectively.122 Gangs control poverty-stricken 
 
118. Fleeing For Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 1, 
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neighborhoods in an ongoing fight for control of territory.123 
They are omnipresent, extorting poor civilians and small business 
owners, and discouraging families from routine activities like 
attending school, visiting relatives, or working in territories 
controlled by a rival gang.124 Gangs have been a leading cause of 
many unaccompanied minors leaving their home countries as 
they seek to avoid recruitment or exploitation at the hands of 
these gangs.125 Further, gender-based violence pervades the 
region, as women find themselves at increased risk of femicide, 
rape, kidnapping, and torture.126 Ultimately, a number of push 
factors have culminated in the mass exodus of nationals from El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, with the Trump 
Administration unwilling to address the humanitarian crisis that 
has resulted.127 
President Trump framed immigrants as a danger to US 
national security and warned that they threaten to drive up crime 
and violence in US cities.128 On the contrary, extensive research 
has proven that the converse is true, and that immigrants are no 
more likely than US citizens to commit crimes.129 A survey of fifty-
one studies conducted to investigate the immigration-crime 
relationship, encompassing a comprehensive range of violent and 
property crimes, revealed a “null or nonsignificant association 
between immigration and crime.”130 When assessing the 
immigrant-crime relationship with regard to the number of 
immigrants incarcerated, a Cato Institute study “found that legal 
and undocumented immigrants were less likely to be incarcerated 
than native-born Americans.”131 Many of the non-citizens that end 
 
123. Seth Robbins, 3 Crime Factors Driving Northern Triangle Migrants Out, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/crime-factors-
pushing-northern-triangle-migrants-out/ [https://perma.cc/ZM64-H7YA]. 
124. Id. 
125. Fleeing For Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis, supra note 118. 
126. Cheatham, supra note 118; Fleeing For Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis, 
supra note 118. 
127. See discussion supra notes 118-127. 
128. Tanvi Misra, For the Last Time, Here’s the Real Link Between Immigration and Crime, 
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131. Misra, supra note 127. 
1054 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:4 
up in the prison system are those whose immigration offenses 
have been treated as federal crimes, a fairly common occurrence 
as non-citizens often face harsh penalties for even the smallest of 
offenses.132 Some of the leading explanations for the weak 
correlation between crime and immigration suppose that 
immigrants “who come to the country either self-select so that 
they are less likely to cause crime to begin with, or they have much 
more to lose by committing crime and therefore are more easily 
deterred.”133 Statistics addressing the immigration-crime 
relationship prove that negative national security implications 
threatened by the President’s rhetoric have been largely 
exaggerated. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY RHETORIC ON 
PUBLIC OPINION, IMMIGRATION POLICY, AND 
COMMITMENT TO TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
International law can broadly be described as a complex web 
of rules, principles, and practices that govern relations between 
states, whose authority is derived solely from two sources: treaties 
and customary international law.134 Treaties, binding agreements 
between two or more countries, are of particular importance as 
they serve to “ensur[e] stability, reliability, and order in 
international relations,” facilitating cooperation among their 
signatories.135 Should a country fail to carry out its obligations 
pursuant to an international agreement, it may be subject to 
economic, diplomatic, or military sanctions, pressure and 
reprisals from the United Nations and its agencies, and lawsuits 




134. See generally Malcolm Shaw, International Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
135. ON THE ROLE OF TREATIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1 (Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach 
eds., 2012). 
136. Uphold International Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/uphold-international-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/RJ78-2EUX] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020); see also, Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Jan. 22, 1996), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law 
[https://perma.cc/KNU5-HR7H]. 
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international agreements, the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are 
accompanied by their respective obligations, characterized by the 
duty they impose on national governments to provide, without 
discrimination, enumerated protections for individuals fleeing 
persecution.137 
The United States is one of 146 state parties to the 1967 
Protocol, which is interpreted and implemented differently 
across the world.138 A country’s capacity and willingness to process 
asylum and refugee applications may depend on its treaty 
obligations, as well as a host of various geopolitical factors 
including, inter alia, economic impact, demographic balance, 
political stability, regional instability, and religious sectarian 
tensions driving legitimate national security concerns.139 Attitudes 
towards refugees and immigrants vary from country to country, 
though in each, government leaders’ rhetoric affects the 
country’s inclination to pursue resettlement goals, and often 
results in the politicization of humanitarian issues.140 In 
examining the ability and readiness of the United States to accept 
refugees and asylees, the United States has arguably, especially in 
recent years, neglected or violated its international obligations 
under both the letter and spirit of the 1967 Protocol. Further, a 
majority of the geopolitical factors precluding a number of 
countries from hosting refugees in large numbers are either 
absent or a de minimis concern in the United States. As in other 
countries, however, anti-immigrant government rhetoric fuels 
nationwide anti-immigrant sentiment and harsh immigration 
policy, reducing the impetus for enacting reforms that would 
benefit refugees and asylum seekers, and ultimately, US citizens. 
 
137. Implementation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
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138. Luis Acosta, Refugee Law and Policy in Selected Countries, L. LIBR. CONG. (March 
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Protocol, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/3b73b0d63.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8D8A-7Q49] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
139. See discussion infra notes 141-162. 
140. See id. 
1056 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:4 
Section III.A of this Note analyzes the refugee and asylum 
policies of the United States as compared to those of fellow state 
signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
distinguishing between those neglecting international 
obligations and those fulfilling their commitments to refugees 
and asylum-seekers. It discusses the rationale and repercussions 
of prohibitive immigration policies in states including Japan and 
Poland, comparing the detrimental effects of these policies to the 
net positive effects of immigration policy adhering to 
international obligations, such as that of Canada. It analyzes the 
role of geopolitical challenges and anti-immigrant rhetoric in 
perpetuating restrictive anti-immigrant policy, noting that 
government rhetoric, rather than any real threat posed by 
newcomers, may be the driving factor of countries including the 
United States’ non-compliance with its international obligations. 
Lastly, it likens the ability of the United States to offer 
comprehensive refugee and asylee protections to that of Canada, 
a country  welcoming of refugees, discussing how anti-immigrant 
rhetoric on the part of the government is impeding the United 
States’ ability to fully comply with its international obligations. 
Section III.B examines specific detrimental refugee and asylum 
policies imposed by a demonstrably anti-immigrant 
administration, discussing the effects of xenophobic discourse on 
executive agencies’ administration of these increasingly harmful 
policies. It then suggests the potential effects on the United States 
of continued non-compliance, drawing possibilities from the 
prior discussion of fellow signatories that have neglected their 
obligations under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. A 
fundamental shift in the government’s attitude towards 
immigrants and the current immigration framework, 
supplemented by pro-immigrant initiatives, may suffice for 
purposes of providing adequate protection for refugees and 
asylum-seekers, and fulfilling US obligations under the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
A. Prohibitive Refugee Policy and International Commitments: Japan 
& Poland’s Obligations Unfulfilled 
Among the state signatories of the 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol, several states continue to adhere to restrictive 
immigration policy, failing to provide agreed-upon protections 
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for refugees and asylees. In some cases, this neglect of 
international obligations can be attributed to unique geopolitical 
constraints; in others, to enduring anti-immigrant government 
rhetoric precluding more permissive immigration policy.141 The 
repercussions of unduly restrictive immigration policy likewise 
vary but tend to be unfavorable. The international community has 
admonished Japan, for instance, for its prohibitive refugee policy 
on an international scale, but domestically Japan also risks labor 
shortages due to an aging population and a historical aversion 
towards immigrants.142 Meanwhile, the international 
community’s reproach of Poland for its failure to accept 
responsibility for resettlement of refugees pursuant to the EU 
resettlement scheme143 culminated in its April 2020 appearance 
before the International Court of Justice.144 
Obstacles that preclude refugees from resettlement in Japan 
include procedural constraints on submitting applications and 
slow vetting processes, often resulting in years of wait time.145 The 
government’s lack of incentive to reconsider its refugee and 
asylee policies can be traced to a two hundred-year history of 
isolationism, resulting in a homogenous society and a general 
preference for maintaining such homogeneity.146 Further, a 
conflict-ridden history with neighboring North Korea resulted in 
fears of opening the borders to increased numbers of North 
Korean refugees, giving the government a national-security 
related justification for low admission rates. Japan’s undesirability 
as a resettlement destination also explains its numbers, with 
roadblocks including a mandatory six-to-nine-month orientation 
course, a high cost of living, and language barrier that renders it 
difficult for non-citizens to assimilate.147 
Japan’s efforts to maintain ethnic homogeneity and 
discourage immigration have resulted in backlash from United 
 
141. See, e.g, discussion infra notes 157-162. 
142. See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text. 
143. See Legislative Train Schedule Toward a New Policy on Migration, supra note 8. 
144. See generally infra notes 157-162 and accompanying text. 
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1058 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:4 
Nations human rights experts,148 and its restrictive policies have 
created demographic problems of their own, as the country’s 
rapidly aging population precipitates a high risk of labor 
shortage.149 As the United Nations pushes for Japan to align with 
its obligations under the 1967 Protocol and risks associated with 
its aging population intensifies, the Japanese government is slowly 
beginning to take steps to rectify and reform its anti-immigrant 
policies.150 In allowing for an increase in immigration, Japanese 
government officials’ rhetoric remained pragmatic rather than 
political, focusing on the need for an increased labor force in 
certain sectors.151 The public response has been overwhelmingly 
positive, proving that “increased immigration is possible without 
a mass backlash.”152 For a nation whose isolationist history, 
geopolitical obstacles, and regional tensions have arguably 
resulted in neglect of its obligations towards refugees under 
international law, the Japanese government’s slow progress 
towards opening new pathways for refugees and support for 
increased immigration indicate its desire to comply with its 
international obligations, and serves as evidence that increased 
immigration tends to benefit society at large. 
In Europe, Poland was likewise condemned for its failure to 
adhere to the provisions of the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol among other international agreements. Sharing with 
Japan a societal preference for ethnic homogeneity but lacking 
similar geopolitical barriers to resettlement, the key factor driving 
Poland’s aversion towards accepting a share of Europe’s influx of 
refugees appears to be xenophobia, as illustrated by the rhetoric 
 
148. Martin Gelin, Japan Radically Increased Immigration—and No One Protested, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 23, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/japan-
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Countries Handle Immigration?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), 
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the course of five years. Chan, supra note 145; see also Gelin, supra note 148. 
151. See Gelin, supra note 148. 
152. Id. 
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of top government officials.153 Poland has evolved from a nation 
that once generated a large number of the world’s immigrants to 
a relatively wealthy nation with the economic capacity to resettle 
refugees in larger numbers than its policies currently allow.154 
However, Polish law pertaining to refugees and asylees still lacks 
provisions to offer adequate protection for asylum-seekers and 
refugees under the 1951 Convention’s non-refoulement 
principle.155 Fellow European Union member countries have 
criticized Poland for its failure to take in refugees, culminating in 
a recent European Court of Justice decision holding that the 
country violated the European Convention on Human Rights by 
denying thirteen Russian refugees the opportunity to apply for 
international protection.156 
Despite having pledged to resettle just 900 refugees under 
the European Union’s relocation plan,157 Poland failed to fulfill 
its obligations, citing the need to “protect Poland’s internal 
 
153. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text. 
154. See The Conversation, With History of Emigration, Poland Now Confronts 
Immigration Crisis, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 24, 2015), 
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Deal on Refugee Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), 
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hungary-poland-czech-republic.html [https://perma.cc/7B8X-TYAG] (mentioning that 
Poland indicated it could swiftly relocate 100 persons to its territory but made no effort 
to do so, and made no additional relocation commitments); see also Background 
Information on the Situation in Poland in the Context of the “Safe Third Country” Concept, 
UNCHR (Nov. 1, 1995), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31d37.html 
[https://perma.cc/CV4E-8JW2] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021); see also Universal Periodic 
Review – Poland, OHCHR (May 2017),  
https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session27/PL/PolandHCLetter.p
df [https://perma.cc/TL9L-Q95L] (discussing the High Commissioner of Human 
Rights’ recommendation that the Polish government fulfill its obligations under 
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156. See Reuters Staff, Poland should help those fleeing persecution, U.N. says, REUTERS 
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should-help-those-fleeing-persecution-u-n-says-idUSKCN24P1JU 
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[https://perma.cc/X4JK-MLTQ]; see also EU to sue Poland, Hungary, and Czechs for 
refusing refugee quotas, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-42270239 [https://perma.cc/9SF2-NZPV]. 
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security and defend it against uncontrolled migration.”158 
Echoing the anti-immigrant rhetoric of President Trump, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland’s right-wing Law and 
Justice Party, outwardly expressed disdain for the plan to provide 
for the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing 
the Syrian civil war.159 Kaczynski declared that migrants carry 
diseases, and that Poland would not accept refugees after “recent 
events connected with acts of terror.”160 The European 
Commission ultimately sued Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic before the European Court of Justice for the countries’ 
refusal to implement the refugee quotas laid out in the European 
Union’s 2015 resettlement scheme.161 In April 2020, the court 
ruled that by “refusing to take in their fair share of asylum seekers 
at the height of the refugee crisis in 2015,” the three countries 
violated their obligations under international law, and may be 
subject to future repercussions determined by the European 
Commission.162 
A number of organizations performed research during the 
peak years of the migration crisis which calls the veracity of the 
Polish government’s rhetoric into question.163 Whereas Poland’s 
right-wing government leaders have fueled domestic xenophobia 
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by painting immigrants as a national security threat, statistics 
taken from surrounding countries including Italy, who took in 
the majority of new arrivals, suggest that there is no correlation 
between arriving migrants and rising crime rates.164 In Italy, data 
from the Italian National Institute of Statistics collected between 
2007 and 2016 indicate that crime has decreased in all regions of 
the country by nearly twenty-five percent, while the number of 
individuals granted asylum increased exponentially.165 Data 
gathered to determine the number of crimes committed by non-
Italians during this time confirms the same decreasing trend 
within every region of Italy.166 These statistics support the notion 
that regardless of the veracity of government leaders’ rhetoric, it 
is a key factor in influencing public opinion and immigration 
policy, thus, determining the extent to which a country fulfills its 
obligations to refugees under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol. 
B. Benefits of Pro-Refugee Policy: Canada’s Commitment to Refugee 
Resettlement Under International Law 
The dramatic effect of government rhetoric on refugee 
policy and public opinion is all the more evident when countries 
taking an anti-immigrant stance are contrasted against those with 
refugee policy developed in compliance with obligations under 
international law. In Canada, with popular support, the Trudeau 
administration has generally maintained its commitment to 
welcoming refugees and asylum seekers.167 Canada acceded to the 
1967 Protocol in 1969 and has recently surpassed the United 
States in refugee admissions, having resettled over 30,000 
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refugees in 2019.168 Unaffected by the geopolitical factors that 
may prevent fellow signatory countries from resettling refugees in 
large numbers, Canada’s successes in refugee resettlement can 
largely be attributed to proactive policies promulgated by 
government officials who frame the influx of newcomers as a 
benefit rather than a threat.169 
For over forty years, the Canadian government has gone to 
lengths to counter domestic anti-immigrant sentiments and 
create a place for refugees and asylum seekers within Canadian 
society.170 The government has raised support for pro-immigrant 
initiatives by sharing success stories and has implemented 
programs including the longstanding Private Sponsorship of 
Refugees program and a more recently launched pilot program 
admitting refugees to Canada through economic immigration 
processes.171 Through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees 
Program, over two million Canadians have helped sponsor a 
refugee for a period of up to a year, providing aid in the form of 
monthly costs for necessities and emotional and social support to 
help newcomers settle in.172 These government initiatives serve 
not only to open the doors for refugees and asylees, but to 
influence public perception of arriving immigrants.173 Their 
longevity and success correlates to the support from government 
officials, whose rhetoric generally assuages, rather than 
aggravates, national security concerns.174 
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Canadian refugee and asylum policies exemplify the 
possibility of satisfying an international obligation to provide 
protections for refugees without sacrificing national security. 
Refugees eligible for resettlement from overseas camps first go 
through extensive screening procedures administered by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), 
and about one percent of those screened are then selected for 
resettlement by countries like the United States and Canada.175 
Canadian visa officers responsible for the second round of 
screening conduct thorough interviews, take candidates’ 
biometrics, and perform background checks through the 
databases of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the 
Canada Border Services Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
and Interpol.176 The border agency then verifies newcomers’ 
identities a third time when they arrive at ports of entry.177 As 
asylum-seekers apply from within the country, they bypass the 
UNHCR screening.178 However, they must still complete the other 
above-mentioned security procedures and background checks.179 
The refugee determination process is designed to thoroughly 
screen candidates and check for a range of bars to admissibility, 
with little to no likelihood of a potential security risk going 
unnoticed.180 
The efficacy of Canada’s refugee vetting system is evidenced 
by the low crime rate among Canada’s immigrant population. In 
analyzing the results of studies performed by Statistics Canada, 
the Canadian Council for Refugees found that much like in Italy, 
the connection between immigration and crime in Canada is 
inverse, if any.181 In essence, increased immigration correlates to 
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less crime.182 For instance, a study evaluating the correlation 
between immigration and crime in the city of Toronto indicated 
that “the higher the proportion of recent immigrants in a 
neighborhood, the lower the rates of drug offenses, all types of 
violent crime, mischief and other thefts.”183 The statistics 
discussed provide further support for the notion that refugees 
arriving in countries like the United States and Canada do not 
present a significant national security threat.184 It is critical to 
remember that refugees and asylum-seekers flee their countries 
of origin with the intention of seeking protection from 
persecution. Thus, though there is always a possibility that 
individuals will try to use the US or Canadian immigration systems 
as a means to a wrongful end, the level of risk is statistically 
insignificant, failing to serve as adequate justification for turning 
these individuals away at the border.185 
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C. The United States 
1. Effects of Rhetoric Conflating Immigration and National 
Security on Refugee and Asylum Policy 
Consistent with the rhetoric of his 2016 presidential 
campaign, Donald Trump’s presidency culminated in what was 
effectively a siege on immigration. During his campaign, 
President Trump framed both refugees fleeing from Syria and 
migrants escaping the Northern Triangle as national security 
threats.186 His administration indiscriminately portrayed all 
immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers included, as a threat to 
American society.187 From the very first days of the Trump 
Administration, the President and those acting under him 
employed rhetoric conflating immigration and national security 
as alleged justification for directing immigration agencies to carry 
out a harsh, enforcement-based agenda.188 Similarly, the Trump 
Administration invoked harmful rhetoric to fuel nationwide anti-
immigrant perception in a clear effort to garner public support 
for said agenda.189 
There is ample evidence of the Trump Administration’s use 
of inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric to influence US refugee 
and asylum policy. In an executive order promulgated in 2017, 
the President expounded the national security threat that 
undocumented aliens presented to the American public, 
erroneously emphasizing that terrorists and criminals seeking to 
harm Americans enter the United States by way of illegal 
immigration.190 Such rhetoric was then used to illustrate the 
necessity of allocating substantial resources for the further 
 
186. Deborah Amos, 2018 Was a Year of Drastic Cuts to U.S. Refugee Admissions, NPR 
(Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680308538/2018-was-a-year-of-
drastic-cuts-to-u-s-refugee-admissions [https://perma.cc/UTU9-F54G]; Sarah Pedigo 
Kulzer & Ryan Phillips, Those Who Must Die: Syrian Refugees in the Age of National 
Security, HUM. RTS. REV. (Feb. 19, 
2020), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12142-020-00582-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SE3A-HJL6]. 
187. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
188. See discussion infra notes 190-96. 
189. See, e.g., infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. 
190. Exec. Order No. 13767 , 86 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (2017), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02095/border-security-
and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https://perma.cc/94T6-NSYR]. 
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development of detention facilities, and authorizing state and 
local law enforcement officials to act as immigration officers in 
investigating, apprehending, and detaining aliens.191 In stating 
that it is the executive branch’s policy “to end the abuse of parole 
and asylum provisions currently used to prevent the lawful 
removal of removable aliens,” the President suggested that 
asylum-seekers are abusing the system to gain entry into the 
United States—an assertion that has not been substantiated to 
date.192 
In a 2018 speech delivered by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, 
Sessions mirrored Trump’s rhetoric and explained that the 
Trump Administration’s zero-tolerance policy and transfer of 
additional prosecutors to the border was effectuated in the 
interest of national security, insinuating that those crossing the 
border are doing so with the deliberate intent to bypass lawful 
avenues for admission.193 Trump’s Press Secretary, Sean Spicer, 
said that the President wanted to “take the shackles off” ICE 
agents so they could conduct more arrests, and given the increase 
in apprehensions inside of courthouses, at USCIS offices, and in 
workplaces, it appears that the President’s narrative has spurred 
ICE officers to do just that.194 President Trump emboldened ICE 
to militantly step up enforcement efforts—with arrests increasing 
by forty-two percent within the first eight months of his 
administration. President Trump’s actions evidenced a stark 
contrast from his predecessors, who acted with a degree of 
compassion in focusing enforcement efforts on deportation of 
 
191. Id. 
192. Id.; Mariam Valverde, Jeff Sessions claims asylum system rampant with fraud and 
abuse, POLITIFACT (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2017/oct/19/jeff-sessions/jeff-sessions-claim-
about-asylum-system-fraudulent/ [https://perma.cc/X37N-SJUZ]. 
193. Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Remarks Discussing the Immigration 
Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018) (transcript available 
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-
discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/V3TW-4Z59]). 
194. Nicholas Kulish et al., Immigration Agents Discover New Freedom to Deport Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/ice-
immigrant-deportations-trump.htm [https://perma.cc/KA2D-YCWU]; see also Trevor 
Timm, ICE Agents are Out of Control. And They Are Only Getting Worse, GUARDIAN (May 13, 
2017) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/31/ice-agents-out-of-
control-immigration-arrests [https://perma.cc/TY43-SXWM]. 
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individuals with criminal records.195 ICE officers, faced with the 
moral dilemma of arresting innocent individuals, grew 
accustomed to validating their actions with national-security 
justifications.196 Thus, the executive’s xenophobic rhetoric played 
a key role in the Trump Administration’s promulgation of 
damaging anti-immigrant policy. 
Further evidence connecting national-security based anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policy is the public support for Trump-
era policies, such as the highly publicized border wall.197 In a 2016 
survey of Trump’s supporter base, sixty-six percent of registered 
voters supporting Trump perceived immigration as a “big 
problem,” fifty-nine percent associated undocumented 
immigrants with serious criminal behavior, and an astounding 
seventy-nine percent favored construction of the US-Mexico 
border wall.198 The same voter base overwhelmingly favored 
immigration law enforcement as an administrative priority, rather 
than providing a path to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants.199 A survey of sixty-four rallies held by Trump during 
his presidency showed that the President used the words 
“predator,” “invasion,” “alien,” “killer,” “criminal,” and 
“animal” over 500 times while discussing immigration, including 
an exchange in which the President asked a crowd of supporters 
how best to stop an influx of people crossing the border, and an 
audience member responded “shoot them.”200 The President’s 
anti-immigrant vitriol sparked an upsurge in violence, with 
counties that hosted Trump rallies witnessing a dramatic increase 
in hate crimes, primarily targeting those perceived to be 
 
195. Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized Ice, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772/ 
[https://perma.cc/65EA-5SSW]; see also Timm, supra note 194. 
196. See Foer, supra note 195. 
197. Carroll Doherty, 5 facts about Trump supporters’ views of immigration, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/25/5-facts-
about-trump-supporters-views-of-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/R2DJ-CV5Z]; see 
discussion supra notes 90-94. 
198. See Doherty, supra note 197. 
199. Id. 
200. John Fritze, Trump used words like ‘invasion’ and ‘killer’ to discuss immigrants at 
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immigrants.201 Perpetrators of recent acts of domestic terrorism, 
including the 2019 El Paso shooting and the 2018 Pittsburgh 
synagogue massacre, echoed nativist, anti-immigrant sentiments 
as their primary motivation.202 While a majority of Americans 
disagree with the Trump Administration’s immigration policy, 
radical voices endorsing Trump’s immigration agenda indicate 
that a significant portion of the country perceives immigrants as 
a threat to US safety, and supports punitive policies aimed at 
reducing that illusory threat.203 
There has been abundant international criticism of each 
policy enacted by the Trump Administration aimed at stemming 
immigration and deterring refugees and asylum applicants from 
seeking protection under US law.204 A number of the policies 
recently enacted were condemned as potentially violative of the 
key non-refoulement principle articulated in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention,205 which stipulates that refugees should not be 
forcibly returned to territories where they would experience 
persecution.206 The Agreement Between the Government of the 
 
201. Tyler Anbinder, Trump has spread more hatred of immigrants than any American in 
history, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-
has-spread-more-hatred-of-immigrants-than-any-american-in-
history/2019/11/07/7e253236-ff54-11e9-8bab-0fc209e065a8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LU25-5EAK]; see also Suman Raghnathan, Trump’s Xenophobic Vision 
of America is Inciting Racist Violence, NATION (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/trumps-xenophobic-vision-of-america-is-
inciting-racist-violence/. 
202. See Anbinder, supra note 201. 
203. Public Priorities for US Asylum Policy: More Judges for Cases, Safe Conditions for 




204. See, e.g., U.N. rights chief ‘appalled’ by US border detention conditions, says holding 
migrant children may violate international law, UN NEWS (July 8, 2019), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1041991 [https://perma.cc/4DXT-2VE7]; 
Mark Berman, U.N. Experts say Trump immigration order violates U.S. human rights 
obligations, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/02/01/u-n-experts-say-trump-immigration-order-violates-u-s-human-
rights-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/27LC-QT4C]. 
205. See, e.g., USA: You Don’t Have Any Rights Here, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/10/usa-treatment-of-asylum-
seekers-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/9NLT-EYZN] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 
206. See 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33; Peniel Ibe, The dangers of Trump’s 
“safe third country” agreements in Central America, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (July 28, 2020), 
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United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Guatemala on Cooperation Regarding the Examination of 
Protection Claims, for instance, creates yet another roadblock for 
individuals fleeing dangerous conditions in their home 
countries.207 Under the agreement, if migrants fail to make an 
asylum claim in any of the countries traversed before reaching the 
border, they are deemed ineligible for asylum in the United 
States.208 They may then be sent to countries where they have 
access to adequate and fair procedures for adjudicating asylum 
claims, a reference to Guatemala.209 
Guatemala, however, is one of the world’s most violent and 
poverty-stricken countries, and its nationals account for a 
significant fraction of the current asylum-seeking migrant 
population.210 Sending those seeking international protection 
from imminent danger to an equally dangerous location will have 
no significant positive impact on US national security, and will 




207. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Guatemala on Cooperation Regarding the Examination 
of Protection Claims, Guat.-U.S., Nov. 20, 2019, 84 Fed. Reg. 64095. 
208. Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum 
Cooperative Agreement, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/05/19/deportation-layover/failure-protection-
under-us-guatemala-asylum-cooperative [https://perma.cc/2X5U-USMC]; Nicole 
Narea, Trump’s agreements in Central America are dismantling the asylum system as we know it, 
VOX (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-
honduras-guatemala-el-salvador-explained [https://perma.cc/7KMC-N4FA]. 
209. See Narea, supra note 208. The Trump Administration has decided that 
Guatemala’s legal framework provides “access to a full and fair procedure for 
determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection.” Id. See also Kevin 
Sieff, The US is Putting Asylum Seekers on Planes to Guatemala – Often Without Telling them 




[https://perma.cc/LH7Y-WNE5]; U.S. Government’s New “Safe Third country” Deal with 
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https://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/us-government-s-new-safe-third-
country-deal-guatemala-puts-asylum. 
210. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
211. Stuart Anderson, A ‘Safe’ Third Country Agreement with Guatemala Could be 
Dangerous, FORBES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/07/15/a-safe-third-country-
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threatening to send refugees to unsafe countries lacking the 
infrastructure to properly integrate refugees, the agreement 
conflicts with the United States’ commitment to non-refoulement 
under international law.212 
The “Remain in Mexico” policy, which has been enforced 
since 2019, violates the non-refoulement principle on the same 
grounds, by effectively preventing asylum-seekers from seeking 
US protection and returning them to a territory no safer than 
their home countries.213 Since February of 2019, Human Rights 
First documented that approximately 1,300 asylum-seekers were 
assaulted after being turned away from the United States and 
compelled by the Trump Administration to stay in Mexico while 
the US immigration agencies adjudicate their asylum claims.214 
Mexico’s lack of an adequate infrastructure to handle large 
numbers of asylum-seekers results in migrant families 
overcrowded in temporary border shelters, traumatized and 
impoverished, and forced to confront unemployment and a lack 
of resources.215 In addition, the problematic policy has led to the 
separation of non-parental guardians from children who are then 
classified as “unaccompanied alien children,” and detained alone 
while their adult family members are sent to Mexico for the 
duration of their asylum cases, a process that could take as long 




212. See, e.g., Ibe, supra note 206. 
213. Michelle Chen, Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy is Illegal Under International 
Law, NATION (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/trump-
border-mexico-international-law-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/GU2B-ALF8]; see 
also USA: You Don’t Have Any Rights Here, supra note 205 (discussing Trump 
Administration policies aimed at deterring asylum-seekers from requesting US 
protection, resulting in US violation of the prohibition on refoulement). 
214. Charles Davis, Over 1,300 asylum-seekers assaulted in Mexico while remaining there 
under Trump administration policy, new report says, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/asylum-seekers-assaulted-in-mexico-under-trump-
policy-report-2020-12 [https://perma.cc/6CTY-K5P6]. 
215. See Chen, supra note 213. 
216. Fact Sheet, United States Asylum Process, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-asylum-
process/#:~:text=The%20length%20of%20the%20asylum,his%20or%20her%20asylum
%20claim [https://perma.cc/W9X9-23Y2]. Asylum applications can take anywhere from 
six months to several years to be adjudicated. Id. The timing depends on factors such as 
whether the applicant applied affirmatively or defensively. Id. “As of July 2018, the 
average wait time for an immigration hearing during the defensive asylum process was 
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four years have violated fundamental provisions of international 
agreements to which the United States is a party and have made 
seeking protection within the United States all but impossible for 
humanitarian migrants.217 
The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol impose upon the 
United States obligations to provide for the protection of refugees 
and asylees under US law, including a commitment not to return 
refugees and asylum-seekers to home countries where they have 
been persecuted.218 Should the United States further neglect its 
obligations, it may not only find itself criticized by the 
international community, but may be taken to the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) by a state seeking recourse for US 
violation of its commitments under the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol. The 1951 Convention provides that disputes 
between parties relating to the interpretation and application of 
the Convention may be referred to the ICJ at the request of any 
party to the dispute.219 While no state has yet exhibited intent to 
do so, the United States made no reservation to Article 38; 
rendering it susceptible to future litigation.220 Member states of 
the European Union have in recent history been brought before 
international tribunals for violation of the non-refoulement 
principle, including Poland and Spain, which appeared in front 
of the European Court of Human Rights in 2015 for denying 
entry to asylum-seekers in the city of Melilla.221 Should a timely 
claim be brought, the United States may thus be penalized for 
violation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol’s non-
refoulement principle. 
 
721 days.” Id. As the number of cases increases, there continues to be a huge backlog 
due to a lack of sufficient funding for immigration judges. Id. 
217. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 204-217. 
218. See 1951 Convention supra note 9, at art. 33. 
219. See id. art. 38; see also, Shirley Llain Arenilla, Violations to the Principle of Non-
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220. See Arenilla supra note 219, at 316. 
221. N.D. v. Spain, App. Nos 8675/15, 8697/15 (Feb. 13, 2020), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/spa?i=001-201353; see also European Court Allows Spain’s “Push 
Back” of Undocumented African Migrants, INT’L RESOURCE JUST. CTR. (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://ijrcenter.org/2020/02/21/european-court-allows-spains-push-back-of-
undocumented-african-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/5KXH-REP5]; Spain, ICJ and others 
intervene in case of pushbacks of asylum seekers, INT’L COMM. JURISTS (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.icj.org/spain-icj-and-others-intervene-in-case-of-push-backs-of-asylum-
seekers-2/ [https://perma.cc/Z3FW-MTQK]. 
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2. United States v. Canada - Similar Security Guarantees, 
Different Rhetoric 
Rhetoric appears to be the core factor differentiating US 
refugee and asylum policy from that of countries like Canada, 
which have comparable capacity to accept humanitarian migrants 
and equally comprehensive vetting procedures. Much like in 
Canada, in the United States, refugees and asylum-seekers 
undergo an extensive, multi-step screening process. Refugees 
facing resettlement from overseas become eligible through a 
number of pathways, including UNHCR or embassy 
recommendation.222 Each applicant assigned for resettlement is 
then referred to one of nine US State Department Resettlement 
Centers (“RSCs”).223 The applicant goes through vetting 
procedures under the United States Refugee Admissions 
Program,224 a comprehensive process consisting of a series of 
security checks and interviews, first conducted by RSC staff, then 
in collaboration with the DHS, through USCIS. USCIS makes the 
final determination as to whether an individual qualifies for 
resettlement in the United States. Those who have been approved 
then undergo a health screening and cultural orientation course 
before arriving in the United States, at which point DHS again 
verifies their identity through CBP agents.225 
Those applying for affirmative asylum from within the 
United States bypass UNHCR screening and must apply for 
asylum within a year of arrival by submitting USCIS Form I-589, 
an extensive affidavit detailing the basis for the application, and 
supporting documentation.226 They are then scheduled to attend 
a USCIS asylum interview, after which the asylum officer and 
reviewing supervisory asylum officer make the determination as 
 
222. Claire Felter & James McBride, How Does the United States Refugee System Work?, 




224. See Keung, supra note 175. 
225. Fact Sheet: United States Refugee Resettlement, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-refugee-resettlement/ 
[https://perma.cc/LX6J-5972]. 
226. Ilona Bray, Asylum or Refugee Status: How to Apply, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/asylum-or-refugee-status-how-32299.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4XW-TCQF] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
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to eligibility.227 Individuals apprehended at or within 100 miles of 
the border in the first two weeks after crossing without 
documentation apply through defensive asylum.228 The defensive 
asylum process includes a “credible fear” interview, at which the 
asylum officer makes a threshold determination as to whether the 
individual has a credible fear of persecution or torture.229 Those 
who make it past the “credible fear” interview are referred to an 
immigration judge who then adjudicates the individual’s request 
for asylum.230 If approved, the individual becomes an asylee.231 
The breadth of US vetting processes outlined above leaves 
very little room for error, as confirmed by a number of studies 
examining the national security risk posed by refugees.232 Over 
the last four decades, over 3 million refugees have been admitted 
to the United States, and only twenty of the “154 foreign-born 
terrorists that committed attacks in the United States since 1975” 
were refugees.233 Further, not a single American has been killed 
by Syrian refugee in a terrorist attack in the United States.234 
Rather, studies examining the success of Syrian immigrants 
in the United States found that they are substantially more likely 
to become owners of successful businesses than US-born 
individuals, thus facilitating job creation and contributing 
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visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
229. See id.; Fact Sheet: Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 11, 
2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/Z5GC-W29Y]. 
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2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-
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positively to the US economy.235 Between 2005 and 2015, refugees 
and asylees in the United States since 1980 “contributed $63 
billion more to government revenues than they used in public 
services,”236 and refugees have tended to accept jobs in sectors of 
the economy with labor shortages.237 History has proven that 
much like in Canada, Japan, and a host of other countries, 
acceptance of refugees and asylum-seekers has a net positive 
impact on US society. This fact tends to get overlooked when 
obscured by the government’s outwardly anti-immigrant rhetoric, 
which in turn provides false justification for its increasingly 
restrictive refugee and asylum policies, some of which go so far as 
to compromise international obligations.238 President Trump has 
pushed the rhetoric of protecting national security through 
increased immigration enforcement to the extreme, noticeably 
departing from the policies of past US leaders who, although 
varying in levels of commitment to immigration enforcement, 
had avoided such large-scale attacks on asylees and refugees.239 
An examination of the correlation between immigration and 
crime in the above-mentioned countries, among others, indicates 
that national-security related concerns associated with increased 
migration are negligible. Surely, geopolitical factors including 
regional tensions, political and sectarian disputes, and historic 
attitude towards immigrants affect some countries’ capacity to 
resettle refugees to a greater extent than others. The common 
factor affecting each country’s willingness and ability to resettle 
refugees, and subsequent commitment to its goals under the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, however, is the rhetoric of 
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countries and facilitated agreements with their governments in the hopes of addressing 
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government officials, which has the power to influence public 
opinion and drive immigration policy. The rhetoric employed by 
the US government after 9/11, and with particular vigor by the 
Trump Administration, has served only to vilify those fleeing 
persecution, inciting fear in the American population, and 
allegedly justifying the government’s implementation of 
increasingly radical anti-immigration measures. A review of 
Canada’s historical success with resettlement, by contrast, proves 
that the United States should perceive immigrants as an asset 
rather than a threat, and that it is possible for a country to fulfill 
its obligation to offer protection to refugees and asylum-seekers 
without compromising the importance of national security. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF REFUGEE 
AND ASYLUM POLICY WITHOUT COMPROMISING US 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
The Trump Administration dramatically departed from the 
refugee admissions agenda of its predecessors, and imposed a 
score of inhumane policies to constrict the influx of migrants 
seeking asylum at the southern border.240 President Trump and 
those acting under him have used their authority to compel DHS 
component agencies to carry out questionable and often 
inhumane practices, targeting already vulnerable individuals and 
violating the United States’ obligations to refugees and asylum 
seekers under international law.241 Their xenophobic rhetoric 
shaped the way that many Americans perceive immigrants, 
resulting in widespread fear of, and even violence towards, 
newcomers.242 
While previous administrations’ efforts to initiate 
comprehensive immigration reform have focused on issues such 
as pathways to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, the 
 
240. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 98-108. 
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current humanitarian crisis perpetuated by the Trump 
Administration’s approach towards refugee and asylum 
applicants poses a unique set of issues. The President’s political 
strategy, resting on inciting public anxiety around immigration, 
has pursued the post-9/11 movement towards conflating the 
realms of immigration and national security vigorously.243 Thus, 
any potential reforms must account for national security concerns 
while focusing on providing adequate protection for a 
humanitarian migrant class fleeing danger and persecution.244 
The 2021 administration change provides an opportunity to 
begin shifting the trajectory of US  refugee and asylum policy, by 
implementing sustainable immigration reforms intended to 
reaffirm the nation’s commitment to protecting humanitarian 
migrants. President Biden’s immigration agenda hinges on 
immigration as “essential to who we are as a nation, our core 
values, and our aspirations for our future.”245 Candidly 
acknowledging that while serving as Vice President, he and 
President Obama were unsuccessful in effecting comprehensive 
immigration reform, President Biden pledges to prioritize 
immigration through a multifaceted plan aimed in large part at 
overhauling the Trump Administration’s harmful policies and 
addressing the crisis at the Southern border. President Biden’s 
rhetoric framing immigrants as a benefit to society is an about-
face from the Trump Administration’s portrayal of immigrants as 
an imminent threat, and his proposals for immigration reform 
signify a pivot from excessive enforcement to providing safe and 
legal means for foreign nationals to be admitted to the United 
States.246 Thus, the 2021 administration change is a chance to 
begin untangling the immigration and national security realms, 
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retaining policies such as thorough vetting procedures that 
ensure the safety of the US population, while creating an 
immigration framework rooted in the fundamental American 
principle of welcoming immigrants.247 
Part IV of this Note introduces proposals for reshaping US 
refugee and asylum policy, with an eye toward differentiating 
immigration and national security concerns and creating an 
immigration infrastructure that ensures US commitment to pro-
immigrant values and long-term adherence to its international 
obligations under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. It 
discusses the advantages of a plan to raise the refugee ceiling, 
allowing for the resettlement of a higher number of displaced 
individuals within the United States. It then addresses the need to 
dismantle harmful Trump-era policies precluding refugees and 
asylum-seekers from seeking US protection and preventing the 
United States from fulfilling its commitments under international 
law. It additionally proposes a program for the private 
sponsorship of refugees akin to that of Canada, intended to undo 
the troubling effects of xenophobic rhetoric and build a positive 
perception of newcomers. Finally, it recommends the 
establishment of a multinational coalition focused on capacity 
building for countries admitting large numbers of refugees, to 
ensure that neighboring countries are able to meet their 
international obligations without being overburdened. 
A. Proposal I: Raise the Refugee Ceiling to Enable Resettlement of More 
Displaced Individuals 
The Biden Administration has already pledged to raise the 
refugee ceiling to 125,000 in FY 2022, a marked departure from 
the historically low refugee caps set by his predecessor.248 The 
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domestic advantages of raising the refugee ceiling are great, both 
from a national security standpoint and in accounting for the 
important contributions made by refugees living in the United 
States. Along with efforts to raise the refugee ceiling, however, 
there should also be a floor. To prevent such drastic fluctuations 
in the refugee program as witnessed during Trump’s presidency, 
Congress should consider amending INA § 207(a) to include a 
minimum for refugee admissions, from which future Presidents 
will not be able to deviate.249 From a national security perspective, 
the United States can help prevent conflict and instability by 
increasing resettlement efforts and encouraging similarly capable 
allies to do the same.250 
When international human rights organization Human 
Rights First set forth a series of recommendations for 
comprehensive immigration reform, it urged the United States to 
resettle a larger number of refugees in order to alleviate the 
pressure on overwhelmed allies like Jordan, and to help safeguard 
the stability of overburdened regions that take in the majority of 
the world’s refugees.251 Refugees become a national security 
threat when countries ill-equipped to effectively resettle large 
numbers of refugees are faced with an influx of displaced 
persons. These situations have previously resulted in refugees 
competing over financial resources with local populations, 
tension between ethnic groups, and greater susceptibility of 
young men to become radicalized by terrorist groups.252 By raising 
the refugee cap to allow for the safe resettlement of a greater 
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simultaneously protect its own national security interests, 
ensuring the stability of its international allies, and work towards 
fulfilling its commitments to refugees and asylees under the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
Raising the refugee ceiling and setting a minimum for 
refugee admissions will be all-around beneficial for the United 
States, protecting national security interests and bolstering the 
economy. Refugees have historically contributed immensely to 
US society, with the overwhelming majority integrating 
successfully, learning English, pursuing education, and quickly 
attaining economic self-sufficiency.253 A detailed Department of 
Health and Human Services report (rejected by Trump 
Administration officials opposed to refugee resettlement), found 
that from 2005-2014, refugees “brought in $63 billion more 
revenue to federal, state, and local governments than they 
cost.”254 The employment rate of refugee women is on par with 
that of US-born women, and refugee men are more likely to work 
than US-born men.255 Studies indicate that skilled immigrant 
workers are likely to complement rather than displace their native 
counterparts.256 The immigration of unskilled workers may be 
slightly detrimental in the short-term to unskilled US workers, in 
the long-term compelling them to upgrade their skills and 
ultimately resulting in wage increases.257 Further, as previously 
indicated, the refugee population has proven entrepreneurial, 
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with refugee-owned enterprises generating substantial business 
income and facilitating job creation for native workers.258 
It cannot be underemphasized that the number of displaced 
persons is increasing year after year; therefore, even raising the 
refugee cap to 125,000 will provide for the resettlement of a very 
small percentage of these individuals.259 A similar realization led 
the European Union to amend the 2015 relocation plan which 
Poland and several other nations contravened, adding a goal of 
120,000 additional individuals to be resettled along with the 
40,000 included in the plan’s first iteration.260 Any changes made 
by future administrations must be made with an eye towards 
domestic capacity-building, with the ultimate goal of continuing 
to raise the refugee cap in years to come.261 The following 
Sections discuss avenues for capacity-building, starting with the 
fundamental need to abolish public anti-immigrant sentiment 
and the reshaping of policies designed to deter migrants from 
seeking protection under US law. 
B. Proposal II: Dismantle Unnecessarily Punitive Immigration Policies 
While Retaining Effective Vetting Procedures 
Future administrations will inevitably be tasked with the swift 
dismantling of problematic Trump-era policies that blocked 
access to asylum and jeopardized the fulfillment of its obligations 
under the 1951 Convention and the1967 Protocol. As a starting 
point, the Biden-Harris immigration plan expressly acknowledges 
the harmful effects of policies implemented under President 
Trump, rebuking the Trump Administration for measures taken 
to prevent refugees and asylum-seekers from receiving protection 
under US law.262 Over the last four years, by portraying these 
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individuals as criminals, the Trump Administration succeeded in 
“employing punitive and harsh detention, criminal prosecution 
and family separation tactics” in an attempt to deter those fleeing 
persecution from seeking US protection.263 By doing so, it 
tarnished America’s legacy as a nation welcoming of immigrants, 
separating children from their parents, threatening to return 
asylees and refugees to dangerous conditions, and making asylum 
virtually impossible to attain.264 Undoing these policies will take 
time, as potential legal challenges and bureaucratic hurdles can 
potentially complicate the process of changing regulations.265 
Therefore, future US leaders will continue the difficult task of 
ending policies of prolonged detention, and will have to continue 
holding immigration agencies accountable for poor treatment of 
asylum seekers, and putting an end to enforcement tactics meant 
solely to intimidate.266 
The efficacy of the US vetting system for refugees and 
asylum-seekers serves as further proof that the Trump 
Administration’s policies were little more than unnecessary scare 
tactics imposed to discourage legitimate asylum-seekers and fuel 
anti-immigrant sentiment. The extensive multi-step refugee 
screening process detailed above has proven more than sufficient 
in protecting US national security interests. Albeit procedurally 
distinct, asylum-seekers are subject to similarly thorough vetting, 
including an assessment of admissibility under the many asylum 
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bars.267 Both Canada and the United States have implemented 
similarly efficient screening processes, with data from both 
systems demonstrating a negligible link between immigrants and 
crime.268 However, unlike the Canadian government, US 
government officials have perpetuated a public perception of 
immigrants as a national security threat, resulting in vindictive 
enforcement tactics which, with the advent of an opportune 
moment for comprehensive immigration reform, the 
government can now abolish. 
C. Proposal III: Reframing the Immigration Narrative Through Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program and Additional Government-Backed 
Initiatives 
Efforts to reform US refugee and asylum policy to align with 
the spirit of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol will not 
succeed without contemporaneous, government-backed attempts 
to change the US population’s perception of newcomers. 
Encouraging the US public to view refugees and asylees as human 
beings seeking protection, rather than a security threat, 
necessitates greater interaction between US citizens and 
newcomers, with an eye towards building understanding. 
Facilitating interaction among private individuals and refugees 
has proven to build support for resettlement, as evidenced by 
programs like Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees 
Program. By encouraging private citizens or members of 
organizations to raise funds and directly provide for the 
sponsorship of an immigrant individual or family for a year, the 
program has given Canadian citizens a key role in resettlement, 
resulting in enduring, positive public opinion of refugees.269 The 
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program has served as a model for refugee sponsorship programs 
throughout the world—Britain has launched a similar 
“community sponsorship program,” and approximately twelve 
additional countries have implemented or intend on 
implementing similar initiatives.270 The United States should 
implement a similar program alongside the United States 
Refugee Admissions Program to encourage a greater number of 
individuals to become directly involved in providing protection 
for refugees and effectuating US resettlement goals and 
international obligations.271 
D. Establish an International Coalition Aimed at Capability-Building 
in Countries Hosting Large Numbers of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees 
In addition to raising the national refugee ceiling, the Biden 
administration should consider forming a coalition with 
neighboring countries, particularly Canada and Mexico, both of 
which receive a substantial number of refugee and asylum 
applications yearly, to aid in capacity-building efforts across 
borders. While domestic resettlement of a larger number of 
refugees and asylum-seekers will help mitigate the burden on 
countries with less developed immigration infrastructure, 
supporting the development of effective refugee and asylum 
systems will necessarily involve providing additional forms of 
aid.272 President Biden’s immigration agenda anticipates the need 
for regional leaders to collaborate on a solution for addressing 
the factors driving migration out of the Northern Triangle, and 
acknowledges that strengthening US relations with Canada and 
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lasting coalition between the three neighboring countries, aimed 
towards capability-building via increased funding and regional 
collaboration to address critical issues involving the growing 
migrant population, will enable all three countries to more 
effectively meet their international treaty obligations. 
The immigration systems of the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico are interconnected; however, each of the three countries 
faces distinct difficulties precluding it from offering the highest 
extent of protection to asylees and refugees. Over the course of 
about a decade, Mexico has witnessed a dramatic uptick in asylum 
claims, reaching an all-time high of 70,000 in 2019, as compared 
to just 5,000 asylum requests in 2013.274 As a result, its 
immigration system has become overburdened, lacking adequate 
funding, staffing, and institutional capacity to effectively 
adjudicate high numbers of claims, and resulting in insufficient 
protection accorded to those fleeing from persecution in nearby 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.275 The influx of asylum 
seekers in Mexico can largely be attributed to the restrictive 
asylum policies instituted by the Trump Administration, which 
made seeking asylum in the United States nearly impossible, 
pushing migrants to apply in Mexico instead.276 
US actions have likewise contributed to rising numbers of 
refugees and asylum applications in Canada.277 The Canadian 
refugee framework was well-suited to accommodate a relatively 
steady number of refugees yearly, yet was unprepared for a 
sudden influx of migrants resulting from the US government’s 
admissibility restrictions.278 Canada’s refugee processing system 
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has witnessed backlogs, with lengthy case processing times of up 
to two years, and tens of thousands of individuals waiting to 
appear before Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board.279 It is 
evident that while each of the three countries faces unique 
obstacles, their immigration systems are deeply intertwined, and 
would benefit from increased transparency and coordination to 
enable them to better fulfill their obligations to the protection of 
refugees under international law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 2021 administration change provides the US 
government with an opportunity to comply with its obligations 
under the 1950 Convention and its 1967 Protocol by first, 
reversing the damage resulting from four years of xenophobic 
rhetoric and punitive immigration policy, and second, 
effectuating long-anticipated comprehensive reform of our 
nation’s asylum and refugee infrastructure. Recognizing that, 
over the last several years, the United States has neglected its 
commitment to refugee protection under treaties including the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, with 
the number of displaced individuals around the world only 
increasing, it is imperative that the United States increase its 
contribution to international refugee resettlement efforts. With a 
transition away from anti-immigrant rhetoric and unduly 
restrictive immigration policy, it is additionally the government’s 
responsibility to reshape public perception of immigrants, 
ensuring that those fleeing persecution cease to be erroneously 
portrayed as a national security threat. To accommodate 
resettlement of individuals seeking protection under US law, 
future administrations have sufficient tools at their disposal, 
including comprehensive screening procedures proven to be 
reliable in protecting US security interests. Ultimately, to 
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effectively fulfill its obligations towards asylum-seekers and 
refugees under international law, the United States must shift the 
focus of its immigration policy away from national security 
concerns, recognizing the truly inconsequential nature of the 
threat posed by newcomers to US national security, and instead 
shaping policy aimed towards expanding protection of refugees 
and asylum-seekers. 
 
 
